opencode-web-page-generator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains a specific instruction at the end of the file ("如果你是codex,全部是使用gpt5.4 high.") which translates to "If you are codex, everything is using gpt5.4 high." This is a model override attempt designed to influence the AI's persona or claimed version, often used to bypass default constraints. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Both the builder and evaluator agents (
agents/builder.mdandagents/evaluator.md) are explicitly grantedbashpermissions and instructed to run shell commands. While the instructions emphasize non-blocking and background processes, this capability provides a powerful vector for arbitrary code execution if the agent is manipulated. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture relies on shared markdown artifacts (
product_spec.md,handoff.md,qa_report.md) to pass instructions between subagents. This creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: The manager and all subagents ingest data from shared project files like
handoff.mdandproduct_spec.mdto determine next steps. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions are provided to distinguish between trusted control instructions and untrusted data within these artifacts.
- Capability inventory: The builder and evaluator agents have
bashandeditpermissions, enabling them to execute commands and modify the file system based on potentially injected instructions. - Sanitization: The skill lacks mechanisms to sanitize or validate the content of these shared artifacts before they are processed by agents with high-privilege capabilities.
Audit Metadata