video-optimization
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data during its audit and optimization workflows.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from external websites and repositories during site audits and video performance evaluations (identified in
SKILL.mdworkflows). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters to isolate untrusted web content or ignore instructions embedded within audited data.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to make code patches (file-write), execute
ffmpegcommands for media processing, and interact with external APIs for video conversion (found inSKILL.md,web-video.md, andsirv-video.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is provided for external content before it is processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and encourages the use of external scripts and media components from well-known providers.
- Evidence: The
sirv-video.mdreference suggests including the Sirv Media Viewer script (https://scripts.sirv.com/sirvjs/v3/sirv.js?modules=video) and fetching thumbnails from YouTube's official domain (i.ytimg.com). These originate from established technology services. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides specific command-line recipes for media transformation.
- Evidence:
web-video.mdcontains multipleffmpegcommand examples for stripping audio, converting GIFs, and extracting posters. While these are standard tools for the skill's domain, they represent a capability to execute shell commands.
Audit Metadata