chrome-cdp
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements an
evalcommand that usesRuntime.evaluateto execute arbitrary JavaScript within the context of the user's browser. It also includes anevalrawcommand for sending raw CDP methods, providing high-privilege control over the browser session. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill programmatically scans sensitive file paths in the user's home directory across multiple operating systems (macOS, Linux, Windows) to locate
DevToolsActivePortfiles. These files contain the debugging ports and paths required to hijack or control running browser instances. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs a background daemon architecture. It uses
child_process.spawnto launch itself as a persistent background process (_daemonmode) that maintains the WebSocket connection to the browser and communicates with the CLI via Unix domain sockets or Windows named pipes. The daemon includes a 20-minute idle timeout persistence mechanism. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill retrieves page content, accessibility trees (
snap), and HTML (html) from arbitrary external websites visited by the user. - Boundary markers: Results are returned to the agent as JSON strings, but the content within the
textorhtmlfields is untrusted and lacks specific sanitization against embedded instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-impact capabilities including arbitrary JavaScript execution (
eval), navigation (nav), and automated form interaction (type,click). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or escaping web content to prevent it from being interpreted as instructions by the LLM.
Audit Metadata