opencode-orchestrator-creator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill metadata identifies the author as 'Claude', which is inconsistent with the provided author context of 'igorwarzocha'. This is a deceptive practice that misrepresents the origin of the skill, potentially to leverage the reputation of a well-known AI provider.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The orchestrator environment created by this skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and process data from external local servers without sufficient safeguards.
- Ingestion points: The generated AGENTS.md instructs the agent to use curl to fetch data from /config and /agent endpoints on a range of local ports (3001-3010).
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack any boundary markers or directives to treat the retrieved server data as untrusted, increasing the risk that instructions embedded in a server's response could be executed.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator is configured to run 'curl' and 'jq' commands automatically, providing a vector for automated network operations and data manipulation.
- Sanitization: The skill does not implement any validation or sanitization of the server responses before they are presented to the orchestrator agent's context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to initialize the project environment. It specifically creates a configuration file (.opencode/opencode.json) that grants 'allow' permissions for 'curl' and 'jq' commands, effectively bypassing manual user approval for these sensitive tools in the resulting orchestrator environment.
Audit Metadata