convex-components

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides instructions and code for building LLM-powered agents that process external data.
  • Ingestion points: The startThread and continueThread handlers in references/agent.md accept user input directly via the prompt argument.
  • Boundary markers: The provided code samples and instructions do not include the use of delimiters or specific framing to prevent the underlying LLM from executing instructions potentially embedded within the user-supplied prompt.
  • Capability inventory: Agents are configured with tool-calling capabilities (e.g., accountLookup, fileTicket) and have access to database mutations and queries within the Convex environment.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or validation to filter malicious instructions from the data before it is passed to the generation model.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a mechanism for resolving and executing functions based on string handles.
  • Evidence: In SKILL.md, the documentation promotes createFunctionHandle to pass callback references as strings across component boundaries, which are then cast back to executable handles.
  • Context: This is a design pattern of the Convex framework for cross-component communication but constitutes a dynamic execution surface where string identifiers determine runtime logic.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references several external dependencies from a well-known service ecosystem.
  • Evidence: Instructions include the installation of @convex-dev/agent, @convex-dev/rag, @convex-dev/workflow, and @convex-dev/workpool from NPM.
  • Context: These modules are official components of the Convex platform and are used as intended for backend functionality.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 05:49 PM