convex-components
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides instructions and code for building LLM-powered agents that process external data.
- Ingestion points: The
startThreadandcontinueThreadhandlers inreferences/agent.mdaccept user input directly via thepromptargument. - Boundary markers: The provided code samples and instructions do not include the use of delimiters or specific framing to prevent the underlying LLM from executing instructions potentially embedded within the user-supplied prompt.
- Capability inventory: Agents are configured with tool-calling capabilities (e.g.,
accountLookup,fileTicket) and have access to database mutations and queries within the Convex environment. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or validation to filter malicious instructions from the data before it is passed to the generation model.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a mechanism for resolving and executing functions based on string handles.
- Evidence: In
SKILL.md, the documentation promotescreateFunctionHandleto pass callback references as strings across component boundaries, which are then cast back to executable handles. - Context: This is a design pattern of the Convex framework for cross-component communication but constitutes a dynamic execution surface where string identifiers determine runtime logic.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references several external dependencies from a well-known service ecosystem.
- Evidence: Instructions include the installation of
@convex-dev/agent,@convex-dev/rag,@convex-dev/workflow, and@convex-dev/workpoolfrom NPM. - Context: These modules are official components of the Convex platform and are used as intended for backend functionality.
Audit Metadata