add-cnpg-database

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes make lint and make validate-kustomize, which execute logic defined in the local Makefile. This represents a dynamic execution surface where malicious content in the repository's own build files could lead to unauthorized command execution.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes external data without sanitization or boundary markers.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the user-supplied $ARGUMENTS and through the contents of kustomization.yaml and the output of OpenShift metadata commands (oc get csv).
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or isolation instructions are used to distinguish untrusted data from the agent's internal logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to write and edit files, and execute various Bash commands including oc, kustomize, and make.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks logic to validate or escape user input before it is interpolated into shell commands (e.g., kustomize build <target-path>/), which could be leveraged for command injection.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 19, 2026, 06:57 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — add-cnpg-database