add-cnpg-database
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes
make lintandmake validate-kustomize, which execute logic defined in the localMakefile. This represents a dynamic execution surface where malicious content in the repository's own build files could lead to unauthorized command execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes external data without sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the user-supplied
$ARGUMENTSand through the contents ofkustomization.yamland the output of OpenShift metadata commands (oc get csv). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or isolation instructions are used to distinguish untrusted data from the agent's internal logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to write and edit files, and execute various Bash commands including
oc,kustomize, andmake. - Sanitization: The skill lacks logic to validate or escape user input before it is interpolated into shell commands (e.g.,
kustomize build <target-path>/), which could be leveraged for command injection.
Audit Metadata