github
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
github::execfunction enables the agent to run arbitrary arguments through theghbinary. This provides a broad range of capabilities including repository management, secret manipulation, and account configuration, which could be misused if the agent is misled by malicious input. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes data from external, potentially untrusted sources.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through
github::pr::view,github::issue::view,github::search::code, and various comment/description fields in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety markers to separate retrieved GitHub content from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has high-privilege capabilities such as merging PRs (
github::pr::merge), triggering Actions (github::workflow::run), and the unrestrictedgithub::execescape hatch. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content retrieved from GitHub before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata