harness
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill functions as a durable orchestration loop that ingests external and model-generated data, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection where instructions hidden in data could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context via the
harness::sendfunction payload, reactive trigger event data, and metadata provided toharness::reactfor spawning sub-agents (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The framework uses a deny-by-default tool dispatch policy, requiring explicit globs to allow model-requested calls. It also includes loop breakers such as a reactive depth cap of 8 and spawn rate limits (SKILL.md).
- Capability inventory: The harness has the ability to dispatch tools via
harness::function::trigger, resolve parked calls, and spawn child sessions with sub-agents usingharness::spawn(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of specific input sanitization or escaping for the data payloads processed by the harness, though it relies on engine-level policies to prevent models from calling management functions like
sendorstop(SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata