iii-directory
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill implements functions to retrieve content from external network locations.
- The
directory::skills::download_from_repofunction allows pulling skill folders from GitHub repositories. - The
directory::skills::download_from_registryfunction fetches worker bundles from the vendor's registry atapi.workers.iii.dev. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs file system modifications during its installation phase.
- The
downloadfunctions write external worker bundles to the local disk, making them available for the engine to load. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and serves external documentation and metadata, which creates an attack surface for instructions embedded in that data.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
directory::skills::get(local markdown),directory::registry(API responses), anddirectory::skills::download_from_repo(GitHub content). - Boundary markers: There are no specified delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within the documentation it reads.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to write to the file system and perform network requests to external domains.
- Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or integrity checking of the downloaded worker bundles or markdown files is described in the skill logic.
Audit Metadata