skills/iii-hq/workers/voice/Gen Agent Trust Hub

voice

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted audio input via voice::transcribe and voice::dictation::push, converting it into text that is returned to the agent's context. This creates a surface for indirect instructions to be embedded in audio and executed by the agent.
  • Ingestion points: Audio is received through file paths or base64 PCM chunks in voice::transcribe and voice::dictation functions (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the resulting transcripts are documented.
  • Capability inventory: The system can transcribe audio, manage local model files, and execute system commands for speech processing.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization of the resulting transcript is mentioned before it reaches the agent context.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interfaces with local system binaries for speech synthesis and recognition.
  • Evidence: The skill configuration requires paths to executables such as whisper-cli and piper-tts (tts.piper.command). It also uses system-level tools like say or espeak in file-output mode.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes functionality to manage and retrieve external assets required for its operation.
  • Evidence: The voice::models::download function is used to install local speech models. While the documentation states these are checksum-verified, it represents the programmatic retrieval of external binary data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 24, 2026, 06:57 PM