voice
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted audio input via
voice::transcribeandvoice::dictation::push, converting it into text that is returned to the agent's context. This creates a surface for indirect instructions to be embedded in audio and executed by the agent. - Ingestion points: Audio is received through file paths or base64 PCM chunks in
voice::transcribeandvoice::dictationfunctions (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the resulting transcripts are documented.
- Capability inventory: The system can transcribe audio, manage local model files, and execute system commands for speech processing.
- Sanitization: No sanitization of the resulting transcript is mentioned before it reaches the agent context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interfaces with local system binaries for speech synthesis and recognition.
- Evidence: The skill configuration requires paths to executables such as
whisper-cliandpiper-tts(tts.piper.command). It also uses system-level tools likesayorespeakin file-output mode. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes functionality to manage and retrieve external assets required for its operation.
- Evidence: The
voice::models::downloadfunction is used to install local speech models. While the documentation states these are checksum-verified, it represents the programmatic retrieval of external binary data.
Audit Metadata