obsidian-inbox

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted markdown files from a public-facing inbox directory.
  • Ingestion points: Reads raw .md files and metadata from /Users/ikatkov/Obsidian/Default/inbox/.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings are present to isolate the processed note content from the agent's instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write and delete files, and execute shell commands based on classification logic.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization for the input data before it is used to determine classification or filename slugs.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands to perform file lookups and image conversions.
  • Commands include ls, find, and magick (ImageMagick).
  • The logic interpolates generated slugs and filenames into commands, such as find /Users/ikatkov/Obsidian/Default -name "<new-filename>", which could be exploited if malicious filenames are introduced into the inbox.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches data and media from external sources to enrich notes.
  • Retrieves metadata from well-known services including IMDb (movies) and Goodreads (books).
  • Utilizes external tools like yt-dlp and instagram-gallery-download to fetch media content from social platforms for 'travel' and 'poses' categories.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 20, 2026, 05:05 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — obsidian-inbox