orchestrate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manages worker execution via a specialized runner script (
scripts/codex-worker.sh) that invokes thecodexCLI tool. - Evidence: The script implements rigorous controls including environment variable filtering (
env -i), process group management to ensure full cleanup of sub-processes, and exclusive workspace locks to prevent race conditions during write operations. - Security Controls: The execution logic includes specific checks to prevent path hijacking by verifying the helper's resolution path and rejecting helpers located within the session repository under review.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The delegation framework has an inherent surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes tasks and repo context to brief worker agents.
- Ingestion points: Task descriptions provided via the
/orchestratecommand and general repository state. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mddefine a clear structure for dispatch (labels and headers) and explicitly warn about the potential for workers to inherit uninspected instructions from their environment. - Capability inventory: The delegation mechanism allows workers to write to isolated worktrees (
workspace-write) and spawn sub-processes via shell commands. - Sanitization and Mitigations: The skill enforces the use of JSON Schema for worker outputs, mandatory human review of all worker-generated diffs, and explicit boundary instructions regarding secrets and credential handling.
Audit Metadata