babysit-pr
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which could contain instructions aimed at influencing the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: PR metadata (title and body) fetched via
gh pr view, content from linked GitHub issues, and the codebase diff viagit diff. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' markers when interpolating this external content into prompts for sub-agents.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to modify local files, execute shell commands (via repository checks), and push changes to remote git branches.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the external content before it is processed.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically identifies and executes command-line instructions (e.g., linting, testing, type-checking) by reading repository-specific configuration files such as
AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md, or CI configurations. This allows for the execution of arbitrary shell commands defined within the codebase. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses various shell-based tools including
gitfor branch management and commits,ghfor interacting with GitHub PRs and issues, and spawns sub-agents through shell commands such asclaude -porcodex exec.
Audit Metadata