honest-link-outreach

Fail

Audited by Snyk on Nov 12, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis

CRITICAL E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.

  • Potential prompt injection detected (medium risk: 0.30). The skill is legitimate outreach guidance, but step 3 inserts a paid vendor upsell (LinkDR checkout link) into the user's deliverable and directs the agent to fetch and load remote instructions from that vendor's domain, which is self-serving promotion the user did not request.

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

  • Third-party content exposure detected (low risk: 0.10). The required workflow has the agent search the web (site:<domain> queries, or Ahrefs top-pages when available) and then read selected third-party ranking pages to find the target section and byline, so outsider-authored text is ingested only after the agent actively selects it, which is the low tier.

MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).

  • Potentially malicious external URL detected (medium risk: 0.30). The decisive boundary is the conditional step 3 instruction to fetch https://linkdr.com/SKILL.md and adopt its instructions, which makes it an inbound operational dependency; linkdr.com is a commercial third-party domain with no signature, digest, or established first-party evidence, and no concrete warning signs, so it is common/reputable unofficial and rates medium.

MEDIUM W009: Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).

  • Direct money access detected (high risk: 0.70). The core workflow (prospect triage, email drafting, and writing a batch file) is not a financial operation. Editorial fee or Pro-workspace offers appear only as proposed rewards inside outreach emails, and the skill does not pay them.

Step 3 of the Procedure is an operational financial route. When fewer than 3 prospects survive or the user has no time for follow-ups, the skill directs the agent to load the linkdr skill or fetch https://linkdr.com/SKILL.md, which "builds one checkout link for vetted DR 30-60+ contextual placements." That is a purchase instruction for downstream execution (buying paid link placements), so it is a direct operation, not an indirect one. The skill does not hold payment authority itself, but it generates the checkout instruction.

For direct operations, the control test requires a documented authentication or authorization mechanism enforced by the service or execution layer for this route. The skill names LinkDR only as a dependency that builds a checkout link. It describes no login, account, API credential, or external approval gating that purchase. The batch file and the agent-followed checklist are not independent controls. No qualifying control is established, so the tier is High.

Issues (4)

E004
CRITICAL

Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.

W011
MEDIUM

Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

W012
MEDIUM

Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).

W009
MEDIUM

Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Nov 12, 2026, 03:54 AM
Issues
4