gh-stack
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill's YAML frontmatter identifies the author as 'github', whereas the provided author context is 'ilteoood'. This is deceptive metadata that could lead a user or agent to incorrectly assume the skill is an official GitHub product, impacting the assessment of its trustworthiness.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external, potentially attacker-controlled data from GitHub pull request titles, bodies, and branch names.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through commands like
gh stack view --jsonandgh stack checkoutwhich pull remote PR metadata and branch information. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to treat this ingested data with special delimiters to prevent instruction hijacking.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
ghandgitCLI tools, which have the capacity for network operations and file system modification. - Sanitization: The skill's documentation provides security-focused guidance by recommending the use of JSON for parsing machine-readable state and explicitly warning against the use of
evalon shell path outputs. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill guides the installation of the
gh-stackextension from the 'github/gh-stack' repository. This finding is documented neutrally as it involves a well-known service and repository. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill involves widespread use of shell commands including
gitandgh. It also describes a shell helper function that usescdon paths generated by CLI command output.
Audit Metadata