react-native-brownfield-migration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from project configuration files to determine migration tracks and resolve parameters.
- Ingestion points: The skill logic in
SKILL.mdandreferences/quick-start.mdrequires the agent to inspectpackage.jsonandapp.jsonfor classification. Additionally,references/bare-android-aar-generation.mddirects the agent to resolve placeholders like<android_module_name>from project files. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions provide no delimiters or specific warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the execution of shell commands such as
npm install,npx brownfield,pod install, andnpx create-expo-appacross several files (e.g.,references/bare-quick-start.md,references/expo-create-app.md). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no described process for filtering or validating content read from files before it is used in agent operations.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to perform multiple shell-based operations essential for the migration workflow.
- Evidence: Use of
npm install,npx brownfield, andpod installfor setup and artifact packaging. - Evidence: Recommendation to disable Xcode
User Script Sandboxing(ENABLE_USER_SCRIPT_SANDBOXING=NO) inreferences/bare-ios-xcframework-generation.mdto facilitate React Native build scripts. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the agent to fetch external packages and documentation.
- Evidence: Installation of
@callstack/react-native-brownfieldandcreate-expo-appfrom the npm registry. - Evidence: References to documentation hosted on
oss.callstack.com.
Audit Metadata