top-down-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external, untrusted sources which can contain malicious instructions intended to manipulate the agent's behavior.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill reads merge/pull request descriptions and discussions via
glab, Jira issues and comments viajira, and the code diff itself (including comments) as specified inreview-method.mdandproject-profile.md.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any boundary markers or delimiters to separate untrusted data from system instructions, nor do they include 'ignore embedded instructions' directives.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to use
git,jira, andglabCLI tools, and is explicitly encouraged to generate and run 'throwaway probe scripts' (Category 10).\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the content fetched from these external sources before processing.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
review-method.mdfile instructs the agent to verify suspected problems using 'a throwaway probe script'. This encourages the agent to generate and execute arbitrary code based on its analysis of the task and codebase, which may include untrusted input from the indirect prompt injection surface.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on external command-line tools to function.\n - Evidence: Instructions in
project-profile.mdandSKILL.mdinvolve runninggit,jira issue view, andglab mr view. These tools are used to retrieve context but represent a reliance on the environment's configuration and available permissions.
Audit Metadata