agent-coordination
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a workflow where the main agent reads reports generated by subagents and interpolates their findings into new task prompts. This creates a surface where a subagent could potentially inject instructions into a report that are later executed by another agent in the chain.
- Ingestion points: The main agent reads
.claude/reports/_registry.mdand specific report files within the.claude/reports/directory as described in the 4-Step Workflow (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The
Task Prompt Templateprovided intemplates.mduses structural headers like**Context from registry:**and**Requirements:**. While these provide structure, they lack strong, unique delimiters or explicit instructions to the subagent to ignore instructions contained within the interpolated context. - Capability inventory: The skill is authorized to use
Bash,Write, andEdittools. It includes scripts for file verification (verify.sh) and report archiving (archive_reports.py). - Sanitization: The instructions do not define any mechanism for sanitizing, escaping, or filtering content from previous reports before it is interpolated into the context of a new task.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to execute internal scripts for system maintenance and verification. - Evidence: The workflow (SKILL.md) and reference documentation (reference.md) explicitly instruct the agent to run
.claude/skills/agent-coordination/scripts/verify.shandpython .claude/skills/agent-coordination/scripts/archive_reports.py. These scripts perform file system operations such as moving files, creating directories, and checking file content length.
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