mcp-preflight
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is centered around the
mcp_imagekit_api_executetool, which requires the agent to generate and run TypeScript code dynamically to perform operations such as file management, folder manipulation, and cache invalidation. This pattern represents a significant execution surface where the agent's generated code acts as the primary driver for system interactions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions explicitly mandate the use of an external script (
skills/upload-files/resources/upload.py) for handling local file uploads, as the main API execution tool is limited to URL-based uploads. This involves the execution of code logic stored in an external resource file. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its use of the
mcp_imagekit_devtools_search_docstool. - Ingestion points: Data is ingested from the output of the RAG-powered search tool, which retrieves information from public documentation, guides, and community posts (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to treat tool outputs as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses powerful capabilities through the
executetool and theupload.pyscript (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There are no documented sanitization, filtering, or validation steps for the content retrieved from external community and documentation sources.
Audit Metadata