academic-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function involves ingesting and processing untrusted external data, including research manuscripts, human reviewer feedback, and retrieved web content. This creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions might be embedded within the data.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content enters the agent context at several critical stages, such as manuscript ingestion for integrity checks (Stage 2.5) and processing external reviewer comments (Stage 4).
- Boundary markers: The skill explicitly defines an "Instruction-Data Boundary" to prevent the agent from promoting data-level imperatives to instructions. This canonical rule is reinforced across multiple agent definition files (SKILL.md, agents/integrity_verification_agent.md).
- Capability inventory: The system has the capability to execute local subprocesses (Python/Shell scripts), perform filesystem operations (maintaining project ledgers and caches), and conduct network searches.
- Sanitization: Robust sanitization measures are described, including strict schema validation for handoff artifacts and instructions to avoid inlining user-supplied text into shell commands to mitigate command injection risks (agents/pipeline_orchestrator_agent.md).
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The project orchestrator relies on executing various internal Python and Shell scripts (e.g.,
run_ledger.py,pdf_read_preflight.py,ars_apply_revision_patch.py) to manage project state, transitions, and validation. While these are part of the skill's own code, they involve calling subprocesses with dynamic arguments. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates network operations to retrieve academic metadata and full-text papers for verification purposes.
- Well-known services: It fetches data from established services such as Semantic Scholar and OpenAI/ChatGPT for cross-model verification (agents/integrity_verification_agent.md). These are legitimate research-related endpoints.
- Consent mechanisms: External model invocations and data transmissions are governed by explicit user consent protocols and opt-in configuration flags (SKILL.md, agents/pipeline_orchestrator_agent.md).
Audit Metadata