academic-pipeline

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function involves ingesting and processing untrusted external data, including research manuscripts, human reviewer feedback, and retrieved web content. This creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions might be embedded within the data.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted content enters the agent context at several critical stages, such as manuscript ingestion for integrity checks (Stage 2.5) and processing external reviewer comments (Stage 4).
  • Boundary markers: The skill explicitly defines an "Instruction-Data Boundary" to prevent the agent from promoting data-level imperatives to instructions. This canonical rule is reinforced across multiple agent definition files (SKILL.md, agents/integrity_verification_agent.md).
  • Capability inventory: The system has the capability to execute local subprocesses (Python/Shell scripts), perform filesystem operations (maintaining project ledgers and caches), and conduct network searches.
  • Sanitization: Robust sanitization measures are described, including strict schema validation for handoff artifacts and instructions to avoid inlining user-supplied text into shell commands to mitigate command injection risks (agents/pipeline_orchestrator_agent.md).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The project orchestrator relies on executing various internal Python and Shell scripts (e.g., run_ledger.py, pdf_read_preflight.py, ars_apply_revision_patch.py) to manage project state, transitions, and validation. While these are part of the skill's own code, they involve calling subprocesses with dynamic arguments.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates network operations to retrieve academic metadata and full-text papers for verification purposes.
  • Well-known services: It fetches data from established services such as Semantic Scholar and OpenAI/ChatGPT for cross-model verification (agents/integrity_verification_agent.md). These are legitimate research-related endpoints.
  • Consent mechanisms: External model invocations and data transmissions are governed by explicit user consent protocols and opt-in configuration flags (SKILL.md, agents/pipeline_orchestrator_agent.md).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 17, 2026, 09:15 PM