colab-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install a version of the
google-colab-clifrom a non-official GitHub repository (itzrnvr/google-colab-cli) to enable Windows support. This bypasses official package registries like PyPI. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill is built to execute arbitrary code on remote Google Colab CPU/GPU/TPU instances through the
colab execandcolab runcommands. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing shell commands locally to interact with the
colabCLI tool. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The instructions explicitly mention the path to sensitive Google OAuth2 tokens at
~/.config/colab-cli/token.json. While it includes a warning against printing these tokens, identifying the path facilitates targeted credential theft if the environment is compromised. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes data from external Colab sessions (logs, exported notebooks, and files) which may contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data is brought into the agent's context through
colab logandcolab downloadoperations. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or sanitization rules for handling output from remote sessions.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands and write to the local file system.
- Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering of remote content is defined.
Audit Metadata