skills/imhansiy/my-skills/colab-cli/Gen Agent Trust Hub

colab-cli

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 21, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install a version of the google-colab-cli from a non-official GitHub repository (itzrnvr/google-colab-cli) to enable Windows support. This bypasses official package registries like PyPI.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill is built to execute arbitrary code on remote Google Colab CPU/GPU/TPU instances through the colab exec and colab run commands.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing shell commands locally to interact with the colab CLI tool.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The instructions explicitly mention the path to sensitive Google OAuth2 tokens at ~/.config/colab-cli/token.json. While it includes a warning against printing these tokens, identifying the path facilitates targeted credential theft if the environment is compromised.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes data from external Colab sessions (logs, exported notebooks, and files) which may contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Data is brought into the agent's context through colab log and colab download operations.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or sanitization rules for handling output from remote sessions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands and write to the local file system.
  • Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering of remote content is defined.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 21, 2026, 08:52 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — colab-cli