fable-council
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to probe the local system's
PATHfor specific binaries includingclaude,codex,cursor-agent,gemini,grok, andopencodeand execute them with shell commands. - Evidence: Found in
SKILL.mdunder the 'Procedure' section: 'Probe available CLIs on PATH... Invoke all members concurrently in background processes.' - Evidence: Specific execution flags are provided to bypass security prompts, such as
cursor --trustandgemini --skip-trust. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The deliberation loop involves managing concurrent background processes and utilizing system prompt overrides to control the behavior of headless agent instances.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdmentions: 'Invoke all members concurrently in background processes with a ~300s timeout' and 'Pass system prompt overrides to headless models (e.g. Grok)'. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes and synthesizes architectural plans based on outputs received from other agents, creating a multi-step chain where a malicious or compromised agent response could influence the final synthesized plan.
- Ingestion points: Member agent responses received from CLI executions (
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions mention parsing and collecting responses but do not specify robust delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded malicious payloads within member critiques.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute arbitrary shell commands for tool invocation (
SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no explicit requirement for sanitizing or escaping the output of council members before it is synthesized into the final
counciled_plan.
Audit Metadata