fable-execute
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and act upon untrusted task descriptions, which can influence its behavior and operations within the workspace.
- Ingestion points: The
accepted_cardinput defined in theSKILL.mdfrontmatter is the primary source of external instructions. - Boundary markers: While the
Protocolsection (Stage 1) instructs the agent to manually confirm the objective and scope, there are no technical boundary markers or system-level delimiters to prevent the contents of theaccepted_cardfrom overriding agent behavior. - Capability inventory: The skill is explicitly authorized to modify files (
mutatesWorkspace: true) and execute shell commands for verification purposes (e.g., Stage 5 of the protocol inSKILL.mdand theImmediate Local Verificationsection inreferences/mutation-containment.md). - Sanitization: The instructions do not define any sanitization, filtering, or validation steps for the incoming
accepted_cardcontent before it is used to drive implementation and command execution.
Audit Metadata