fable-learning
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests session transcripts from
~/.gemini/antigravity/brain/and~/.claude/logs/(Ingestion points). It extracts technical "facts" using regex patterns such asRoot cause:\s*(.+), which serve as weak boundary markers that can be bypassed by malicious content within a transcript. The skill has the capability to executeagent-kernel remembercommands and write durable markdown files to the workspace (Capability inventory). Sanitization includes regex-based tag removal and filtering of generic phrases and specific local paths, but it lacks robust validation to prevent adversarial instructions from influencing persistent agent memory (Sanitization). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/extract_learnings.pyscript executes various system commands usingsubprocess.run, includingagent-kernel,gbrain,npm, andbun. These commands are used to store extracted learnings and manage dependencies. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill attempts to dynamically install the
agent-kerneltool usingnpm install -gorbun install -gif the binary is not detected on the system. While targeting standard registries, this dynamic installation of an external dependency at runtime represents a security concern. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and reads full session transcripts and logs from directories like
~/.gemini/antigravity/brain/and~/.claude/logs/. Although the skill intends to distill this information and includes logic to redact secrets, the ingestion of raw transcript files that may contain sensitive developer information poses a risk. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: CLI commands for persistence tools are dynamically constructed and executed at runtime based on data parsed from transcripts.
Audit Metadata