skillify
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple sources to synthesize or update agent instructions. This creates a surface where malicious content embedded in source files, transcripts, or repositories could influence the agent during the synthesis phase.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from external URLs in
ADAPTmode (SKILL.md), video transcripts inCREATE/from-videomode (SKILL.md), pasted notes inCREATE/from-dumpmode (SKILL.md), and recent conversation history inUPDATE/from-chatmode (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to disregard embedded commands were identified in the instruction set for processing external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to write to the file system using the
Edittool, perform Git operations (clone,commit,push), and interact with the GitHub API via theghCLI. - Sanitization: While a license check is performed during adaptation, the skill does not include specific sanitization or filtering logic to detect or neutralize prompt injection attempts within the source data.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches external content to facilitate the adaptation of remote skills.
- In
SKILL.md(ADAPT mode), the skill retrieves skill definitions usinggit cloneand the GitHub API (gh api) from user-provided URLs targeting GitHub and other skill registries. - The
references/adapt-license-check.mdutility usescurlto fetch repository license metadata from the official GitHub API.
Audit Metadata