motion-director
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes several scripts (
gpu_policy.py,work_guard.py,browser_gpu_probe.cjs,clip-audit.js) that interact with the host system usingsubprocessorplaywright. These scripts execute commands likeffmpeg,ffprobe,nvidia-smi, and manage browser-based rendering audits. While these are necessary for verifying hardware acceleration and ensuring render quality, they represent a significant command execution surface. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
SKILL.mdandreferences/hyperframes-playbook.mdfiles recommend the installation of the 'HyperFrames' production infrastructure usingnpx skills add heygen-com/hyperframes. This introduces a dependency on external code from a third-party repository. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process various external inputs, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User-provided creative briefs, scripts, video references for reverse-engineering (Phase 2), and data sources like CSV files for data-driven animation.
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific guidance on using delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in these external assets.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools, including shell command execution (
ffmpeg), browser automation (playwright), and the ability to trigger other specialist skills in the pack. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for content extracted from video metadata, scripts, or data files before they are incorporated into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata