motion-director

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes several scripts (gpu_policy.py, work_guard.py, browser_gpu_probe.cjs, clip-audit.js) that interact with the host system using subprocess or playwright. These scripts execute commands like ffmpeg, ffprobe, nvidia-smi, and manage browser-based rendering audits. While these are necessary for verifying hardware acceleration and ensuring render quality, they represent a significant command execution surface.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The SKILL.md and references/hyperframes-playbook.md files recommend the installation of the 'HyperFrames' production infrastructure using npx skills add heygen-com/hyperframes. This introduces a dependency on external code from a third-party repository.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process various external inputs, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided creative briefs, scripts, video references for reverse-engineering (Phase 2), and data sources like CSV files for data-driven animation.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific guidance on using delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in these external assets.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools, including shell command execution (ffmpeg), browser automation (playwright), and the ability to trigger other specialist skills in the pack.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for content extracted from video metadata, scripts, or data files before they are incorporated into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 4, 2026, 07:55 PM