credential-guardian
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill discloses a comprehensive inventory of sensitive file paths and internal infrastructure details.
- Evidence: Specifically identifies credential locations such as
~/.cursor/mcp.json,/opt/superseller-worker/.env,infra/*.env, andbot-config.json. - Evidence: Discloses a specific production IP address (
172.245.56.50) for a worker server. - Evidence: Flags the presence of over 100 credentials in the version history of
.envfiles and plaintext login credentials in configuration files. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for high-privilege administrative access and the execution of custom deployment scripts.
- Evidence: Explicitly instructs the agent to SSH as
rootinto the production server at172.245.56.50. - Evidence: Includes commands for service management and deployment such as
pm2 restartand./apps/worker/deploy-to-racknerd.sh. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external tool and service outputs without validation.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from
vercel env ls, shell command outputs, and various external API responses (Kie.ai, PayPal, Gemini). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content within processed data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to network operations via
curl, remote command execution viassh, and local file system access. - Sanitization: Absent; no evidence of escaping or schema validation for data retrieved from external environments.
Audit Metadata