credential-guardian

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill discloses a comprehensive inventory of sensitive file paths and internal infrastructure details.
  • Evidence: Specifically identifies credential locations such as ~/.cursor/mcp.json, /opt/superseller-worker/.env, infra/*.env, and bot-config.json.
  • Evidence: Discloses a specific production IP address (172.245.56.50) for a worker server.
  • Evidence: Flags the presence of over 100 credentials in the version history of .env files and plaintext login credentials in configuration files.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for high-privilege administrative access and the execution of custom deployment scripts.
  • Evidence: Explicitly instructs the agent to SSH as root into the production server at 172.245.56.50.
  • Evidence: Includes commands for service management and deployment such as pm2 restart and ./apps/worker/deploy-to-racknerd.sh.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external tool and service outputs without validation.
  • Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from vercel env ls, shell command outputs, and various external API responses (Kie.ai, PayPal, Gemini).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content within processed data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to network operations via curl, remote command execution via ssh, and local file system access.
  • Sanitization: Absent; no evidence of escaping or schema validation for data retrieved from external environments.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 18, 2026, 05:37 AM