notebooklm-hub
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to execute specific local commands, including
notebooklm-mcp-authand a TypeScript script located at a hardcoded path (/Users/shaifriedman/superseller/tools/seed-notebooklm-session.ts) usingnpx tsx. These operations are part of the intended authentication and session management workflow. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with an external API proxy hosted at
worker.superseller.agency. This domain is associated with the skill's author and serves as a legitimate endpoint for routing NotebookLM queries and managing authentication cookies. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external NotebookLM notebooks, creating an indirect prompt injection attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Content retrieved through the
mcp__notebooklm__querytool inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specific delimiters or instructions to treat the retrieved content as untrusted.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables reading, summarizing, and listing notebooks. Other system capabilities depend on the host agent's broader environment.
- Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the notebook response content is mentioned before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata