superseller-higgsfield-discipline

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions and examples for executing commands via the Higgsfield CLI and standard utilities like ffmpeg, jq, and tee for media processing and quality assurance.
  • Evidence: Documentation includes commands like higgsfield generate create and procedures for extracting frames via ffmpeg to verify video quality.
  • Security Note: The documented commands use shell variables (e.g., $PROMPT); while standard for automation, inputs should be properly sanitized by the executing environment to prevent shell injection.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill handles the transfer of generated media assets to external cloud storage and performs database lookups for tenant-specific configurations.
  • Evidence: Generated assets are uploaded to a specific Cloudflare R2 bucket (superseller-public) and asset metadata is registered in a database.
  • Note: These operations are core to the skill's stated purpose of managing tenant-scoped content workflows and target established vendor infrastructure (Cloudflare R2, internal databases).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes an indirect prompt injection surface where it ingests data from external tables and interpolates it into generative prompts.
  • Ingestion points: The skill loads data from Brand, Tenant, and Content_Actors SQL tables (SKILL.md Gates 1-3).
  • Boundary markers: It uses a 'BRAND CONTEXT LOADED' header as a procedural marker, though it does not explicitly define XML or other structural delimiters for the interpolated content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes SQL for lookups, Bash/CLI for generation, and R2 for storage across its scripts.
  • Sanitization: The skill includes logic to normalize model identifiers (dashes vs underscores) but relies on general platform handling for sanitizing the ingested natural language instructions.
  • Note: This finding describes the attack surface; the skill itself uses these mechanisms defensively to enforce brand constraints and negative prompts (e.g., 'STRICT: NO TEXT').
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 18, 2026, 05:38 AM