zentao-shared
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to collect and handle sensitive user credentials, including ZenTao accounts and passwords. It specifically guides the execution of
zentao-cli auth loginwith the password provided as a command-line argument, which can expose credentials in process lists or shell history.- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill directs the agent to read and write sensitive configuration data to files located at~/.zentao-cli/config.tomland.zentao-cli/config.toml. Accessing and modifying these files represents a potential exposure of stored authentication tokens and service URLs.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several shell commands via thezentao-clitool to manage authentication states and configuration settings (e.g.,zentao-cli auth status,zentao-cli config set).- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes instructions to update the CLI tool and add additional skills using package managers (npm update -g zentao-cliandnpx skills add zentao/cli), which involves executing remote code provided by the vendor.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it instructs the agent to monitor and act upon JSON output from thezentao-clitool (specifically the_notice.updatefield). If the tool output is manipulated, it could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: The agent parses the standard output (JSON) of the
zentao-clicommand. - Boundary markers: None identified; the agent is instructed to process the
_notice.updatefield directly. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands, manage local files, and suggest further package installations.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the message content within the
_notice.updatefield before it is presented to the user.
Audit Metadata