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Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mddescribe a process for building and executing Bash commands using Python (e.g.,python "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/eval-runner.py" --action run-quick --file <input>). Because the agent is instructed to interpolate user-provided arguments—such as<file-path-or-content>,--brand <slug>, and--evidence <path>—directly into these shell commands, there is a significant risk of command injection if the inputs are not properly sanitized. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill is designed to read and list files from the user's home directory at
~/.claude-marketing/brands/. Accessing the~/path is a sensitive operation that exposes user-specific data to the agent context. While intended for brand profile management, this capability could be abused to access other sensitive files if the path resolution logic is manipulated. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external content (marketing drafts) through various scripts to detect hallucinations and brand compliance. This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests raw content or files via the
<file-path-or-content>argument described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the content are provided.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute Python scripts, performs file system reads, and writes content to temporary files. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the input content before it is processed by the evaluation suite.
Audit Metadata