import-template
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a mechanism to ingest, process, and persist user-defined templates which are later retrieved and used to structure the output of subsequent agent interactions.
- Ingestion points: The skill takes "Template content" as direct input from the user in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no defined delimiters or safety instructions specified to isolate the user-provided template content, increasing the risk that the agent may follow instructions embedded within the template rather than treating them as data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write directly to the file system (
~/.claude-marketing/brands/{slug}/templates/) and execute a management script (scripts/guidelines-manager.py). - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization step is described to ensure that the template content does not contain prompt injection payloads meant to override agent behavior during the formatting phase of other commands.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local script to perform CRUD operations on the templates.
- Evidence: The process uses
scripts/guidelines-manager.pyto save data to the file system. While this is a local utility, the use of user-supplied variables like{slug}and{name}in the command line (guidelines-manager.py --brand {slug} --action save-template --name {name}) presents a potential surface for command injection if these variables are not strictly validated.
Audit Metadata