send-notification

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local Python script using shell command interpolation in the mandatory execution gate section.
  • Evidence: The skill calls python "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/approval-manager.py" --brand {slug} --action create-approval --data '{"risk_level":"<tier>","summary":"..."}'. The interpolation of the {slug} and notification summary into the command line without explicit sanitization or parameterization poses a risk of command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill depends on the execution of an external script (approval-manager.py) located within the skill's root directory at runtime to handle business logic for approvals and logging.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting configuration and guideline data from multiple local files.
  • Ingestion points: Loads active brand slugs and profiles from ~/.claude-marketing/brands/_active-brand.json, profile.json, _manifest.json, and agency SOPs from ~/.claude-marketing/sops/.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via Python and send messages to external messaging platforms (Slack/Intercom).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The process instructions do not include delimiters or warnings to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the brand profiles or SOP files.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of validation or filtering for the content loaded from the local filesystem before it is used to influence agent behavior or formatted into notifications.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 13, 2026, 09:32 AM