indykite-ciq-whoami
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from the
GET /contx-iq/v1/whoamiendpoint, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the API response is manipulated. \n - Ingestion points: The agent ingests
typeandidstrings from the IndyKite REST API response as described inSKILL.mdandreferences/whoami-reference.md. \n - Boundary markers:
SKILL.mdandreferences/whoami-reference.mdprovide clear instructions to treat these fields as plain identifiers and never as instructions or commands to follow. \n - Capability inventory: The skill uses
curlfor network requests and instructs the agent to use the resulting data in subsequent AuthZEN or CIQ decision requests. \n - Sanitization: There is no programmatic sanitization of the API response in the
scripts/whoami.shscript; protection relies on the agent following the documented safety constraints. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a bash script (scripts/whoami.sh) that executescurlcommands to interact with IndyKite services. \n - The script includes a host-validation check that pins the destination to
https://eu.api.indykite.comorhttps://us.api.indykite.com, ensuring credentials are only sent to authorized IndyKite domains. \n - Sensitive credentials and user tokens are handled via environment variables (
API_KEY,BEARER_TOKEN) rather than being hardcoded in the skill code, following industry best practices for secret management.
Audit Metadata