watch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from external sources, including video metadata (titles, descriptions) and transcripts (from native captions or Whisper API output).
- Ingestion points: Video metadata is ingested in
scripts/download.py, VTT subtitle files inscripts/transcribe.py, and Whisper API responses inscripts/whisper.py. - Boundary markers: The
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to populate specific<!-- pending Claude fill: ... -->markers within the generatedreport.md. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive local execution capabilities through Python's
subprocessmodule, which is used to callffmpeg,ffprobe, andyt-dlpacross multiple scripts. - Sanitization: The scripts utilize list-based arguments for
subprocess.runto prevent shell injection. Additionally,scripts/download.pyimplements hardening measures such as resolving local paths to absolute paths and using the--separator to prevent option injection attacks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes local system binaries using Python's
subprocessmodule to perform video and audio processing. - Evidence includes calls to
ffprobeandffmpeginscripts/frames.pyandscripts/hook.py, andyt-dlpinscripts/download.py. scripts/setup.pyalso facilitates the installation of these dependencies via Homebrew on macOS or by providing manual installation commands for other platforms.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
yt-dlpto download video files and metadata from user-provided URLs. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: When native captions are unavailable, the skill extracts audio segments and sends them to Groq or OpenAI Whisper APIs for transcription.
- This behavior is clearly documented as a core feature of the skill. The endpoints used (
api.groq.comandapi.openai.com) are for well-known and trusted services.
Audit Metadata