skills/inf-sh/skills/remotion-render/Gen Agent Trust Hub

remotion-render

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 4, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill promotes an insecure installation method using a pipe-to-shell pattern (curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh). This allows for the execution of remote scripts from a non-trusted source without user inspection or verification.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the infsh CLI tool with wildcard arguments (infsh *). This provides a broad surface for command execution on the vendor's platform, including potentially sensitive operations like infsh login for credential management.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: During installation, the skill initiates downloads of binary executables from dist.inference.sh. These downloads originate from a source that is not listed as a well-known or pre-trusted provider.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of untrusted data.
  • Ingestion points: The code parameter in the JSON input for infsh app run in SKILL.md accepts arbitrary React/TSX code.
  • Boundary markers: None; the user-provided code is interpolated directly into the shell command payload without delimiters or warnings to the agent to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the infsh tool via the shell, which can execute complex rendering logic and interact with the inference.sh API.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the React code before it is passed to the execution environment.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Apr 4, 2026, 09:10 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — remotion-render