remotion-render
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 4, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill promotes an insecure installation method using a pipe-to-shell pattern (
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh). This allows for the execution of remote scripts from a non-trusted source without user inspection or verification. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the
infshCLI tool with wildcard arguments (infsh *). This provides a broad surface for command execution on the vendor's platform, including potentially sensitive operations likeinfsh loginfor credential management. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: During installation, the skill initiates downloads of binary executables from
dist.inference.sh. These downloads originate from a source that is not listed as a well-known or pre-trusted provider. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of untrusted data.
- Ingestion points: The
codeparameter in the JSON input forinfsh app runinSKILL.mdaccepts arbitrary React/TSX code. - Boundary markers: None; the user-provided code is interpolated directly into the shell command payload without delimiters or warnings to the agent to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
infshtool via the shell, which can execute complex rendering logic and interact with the inference.sh API. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the React code before it is passed to the execution environment.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata