agent-tools
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documents an installation procedure for the official CLI using
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh. This involves downloading and executing a script directly from the vendor's domain to configure the local environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
beltCLI tool to perform operations such as executing AI applications, logging into the platform, and managing remote tasks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: During installation, the skill fetches binaries and verification checksums from the vendor's distribution infrastructure (
dist.inference.sh). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary functionality involves processing user-supplied JSON prompts and local files which are then transmitted to external AI models, creating a surface for indirect injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: JSON input strings and local file paths passed to the
belt app runcommand via the--inputflag, as seen inSKILL.mdandreferences/running-apps.md. - Boundary markers: None present. The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety prompts to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of reading local files, performing network uploads, and executing remote AI tasks through the
inference.shplatform. - Sanitization: Not mentioned. Data is passed from the user or file system to the CLI tool without explicit sanitization or filtering steps documented.
Audit Metadata