agent-tools

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documents an installation procedure for the official CLI using curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh. This involves downloading and executing a script directly from the vendor's domain to configure the local environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the belt CLI tool to perform operations such as executing AI applications, logging into the platform, and managing remote tasks.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: During installation, the skill fetches binaries and verification checksums from the vendor's distribution infrastructure (dist.inference.sh).
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary functionality involves processing user-supplied JSON prompts and local files which are then transmitted to external AI models, creating a surface for indirect injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: JSON input strings and local file paths passed to the belt app run command via the --input flag, as seen in SKILL.md and references/running-apps.md.
  • Boundary markers: None present. The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety prompts to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within the processed data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is capable of reading local files, performing network uploads, and executing remote AI tasks through the inference.sh platform.
  • Sanitization: Not mentioned. Data is passed from the user or file system to the CLI tool without explicit sanitization or filtering steps documented.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 13, 2026, 08:21 AM