customer-persona
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs users to install the
belt-sh/cliand references an installation guide hosted on the author's official GitHub repository. These resources are part of the vendor's intended platform functionality. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides examples for using the
beltCLI to execute specific research and image generation tasks. The commands are well-defined and align with the persona creation use case without attempting to execute arbitrary or hidden code. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes content retrieved from external search engines (Tavily, Exa).
- Ingestion points: Search results retrieved via
belt app runfrom Tavily and Exa are returned to the agent context (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the provided command examples.
- Capability inventory: The skill is restricted to the
Bash(belt *)toolset. - Sanitization: Input sanitization is not explicitly handled within the skill's instructions, relying instead on the agent's internal safety filters.
Audit Metadata