google-veo
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the installation of the 'belt' CLI and related skills from the vendor's own repositories (e.g.,
belt-sh/cliandinference-sh/skills). These are resources owned by the skill author ('inference-sh'). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: User-provided text prompts are ingested through the
belt app runcommand's--inputparameter inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The prompts are encapsulated within structured JSON objects, which helps delimit data from command parameters.
- Capability inventory: The skill is restricted to using the
beltCLI tool within the Bash environment (allowed-tools: Bash(belt *)), limiting the potential impact of any injected instructions. - Sanitization: Input validation and sanitization are handled by the external
beltCLI and the backend API service rather than the skill instructions themselves.
Audit Metadata