python-sdk
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Documentation examples in
references/tool-builder.mdandreferences/agent-patterns.mddemonstrate the use ofeval()to process arguments received from tool calls (e.g.,eval(call.args['expression'])). This promotes a pattern susceptible to Remote Code Execution (RCE) if an agent generates or processes a malicious expression. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The SDK supports "Automatic File Upload" as described in
SKILL.mdandreferences/files.md. Any string in the input schema that matches a local file path is automatically read and uploaded to the vendor's cloud infrastructure. This creates a risk where an attacker could influence the agent to upload sensitive configuration or credential files (e.g.,.ssh/id_rsa,.env) by providing them as input values. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's configuration (
allowed-tools) permits broad shell execution viaBash(python *). Additionally, the SDK includes a built-incode_executioninternal tool that allows agents to write and run arbitrary Python code to solve tasks, as documented inreferences/agent-patterns.md. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation recommends installing external tools such as
npx skills add belt-sh/cli, which downloads and executes code from a third-party registry. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The
descriptionfield inSKILL.mdcontains a significant amount of keyword stuffing ("Triggers") intended to manipulate skill discovery and search indexing rather than providing a clear functional summary. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill builds agents that ingest data from multiple untrusted sources.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
agent.send_messageinputs, external file content fromagent.send_message(..., files=[...]), and results returned fromwebhook_toolorapp_toolcalls. - Boundary markers: The SDK provides a human-in-the-loop mechanism (
require_approval()), but its use is optional and depends on developer implementation. - Capability inventory: The agents have access to arbitrary code execution (internal tools and broad Bash permissions), network operations (webhooks and SDK API), and local file system access (via automatic uploads).
- Sanitization: The provided examples lack sanitization for tool arguments or input file paths, increasing the risk of the agent executing embedded instructions within data.
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