skills/inference-sh/skills/python-sdk/Gen Agent Trust Hub

python-sdk

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Documentation examples in references/tool-builder.md and references/agent-patterns.md demonstrate the use of eval() to process arguments received from tool calls (e.g., eval(call.args['expression'])). This promotes a pattern susceptible to Remote Code Execution (RCE) if an agent generates or processes a malicious expression.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The SDK supports "Automatic File Upload" as described in SKILL.md and references/files.md. Any string in the input schema that matches a local file path is automatically read and uploaded to the vendor's cloud infrastructure. This creates a risk where an attacker could influence the agent to upload sensitive configuration or credential files (e.g., .ssh/id_rsa, .env) by providing them as input values.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's configuration (allowed-tools) permits broad shell execution via Bash(python *). Additionally, the SDK includes a built-in code_execution internal tool that allows agents to write and run arbitrary Python code to solve tasks, as documented in references/agent-patterns.md.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation recommends installing external tools such as npx skills add belt-sh/cli, which downloads and executes code from a third-party registry.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The description field in SKILL.md contains a significant amount of keyword stuffing ("Triggers") intended to manipulate skill discovery and search indexing rather than providing a clear functional summary.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill builds agents that ingest data from multiple untrusted sources.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the context via agent.send_message inputs, external file content from agent.send_message(..., files=[...]), and results returned from webhook_tool or app_tool calls.
  • Boundary markers: The SDK provides a human-in-the-loop mechanism (require_approval()), but its use is optional and depends on developer implementation.
  • Capability inventory: The agents have access to arbitrary code execution (internal tools and broad Bash permissions), network operations (webhooks and SDK API), and local file system access (via automatic uploads).
  • Sanitization: The provided examples lack sanitization for tool arguments or input file paths, increasing the risk of the agent executing embedded instructions within data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 07:24 AM