content-repurposing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references an external installation script for the
beltCLI hosted on the author's official GitHub repository (inference-sh). This is a standard setup procedure for the vendor's toolset and originates from a resource associated with the author profile. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
beltCLI via Bash to run various AI applications for image generation, text-to-speech, and social media posting. The frontmatterallowed-tools: Bash(belt *)provides a security boundary by restricting Bash execution to only thebeltcommand. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes instructions to post content to external platforms like Twitter (X) using
belt app run x/post-create. This behavior is the primary intended function of a content repurposing skill and is performed via the vendor's managed CLI. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data such as blog posts, podcast transcripts (e.g.,
episode-42.mp3), and video content. - Ingestion points: Data enters the context through files or text provided by the user for conversion.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not explicitly define boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions for the processed content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to network-enabled tools for posting and generative tasks (
x/post-create,falai/dia-tts, etc.). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of input text is defined in the workflow.
Audit Metadata