agentic-discovery
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides setup instructions that involve downloading shell and PowerShell scripts from
inflowcli.aiand executing them directly via piped shell commands (e.g.,curl | bashandirm | iex). While these originate from the vendor's domain, they represent high-privilege remote code execution patterns. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
inflowbinary and thebrewpackage manager to perform its core functions and management tasks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network requests to fetch installation scripts, binary components, and service metadata from
inflowcli.aiand other external service origins encountered during discovery. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes content from third-party services. This risk is acknowledged in the 'Security and data handling' section of the skill.
- Ingestion points: Remote service descriptions, product attributes, schemas, and action definitions processed by the
inflow odpcommands (e.g.,SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill does not define technical delimiters or specific instruction-ignore patterns for the interpolated data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to shell tools including
inflow,brew, andcurlto interact with external data. - Sanitization: No programmatic sanitization or validation of the remote service output is described; the skill relies on text-based warnings to the agent to treat content as untrusted.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://inflowcli.ai/install.sh, https://inflowcli.ai/cli - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata