agentic-discovery

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides setup instructions that involve downloading shell and PowerShell scripts from inflowcli.ai and executing them directly via piped shell commands (e.g., curl | bash and irm | iex). While these originate from the vendor's domain, they represent high-privilege remote code execution patterns.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the inflow binary and the brew package manager to perform its core functions and management tasks.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network requests to fetch installation scripts, binary components, and service metadata from inflowcli.ai and other external service origins encountered during discovery.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes content from third-party services. This risk is acknowledged in the 'Security and data handling' section of the skill.
  • Ingestion points: Remote service descriptions, product attributes, schemas, and action definitions processed by the inflow odp commands (e.g., SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define technical delimiters or specific instruction-ignore patterns for the interpolated data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to shell tools including inflow, brew, and curl to interact with external data.
  • Sanitization: No programmatic sanitization or validation of the remote service output is described; the skill relies on text-based warnings to the agent to treat content as untrusted.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://inflowcli.ai/install.sh, https://inflowcli.ai/cli - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 11, 2026, 07:35 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — agentic-discovery