agentic-payments
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides commands to download and execute shell scripts directly from a remote server using
curl | bashandirm | iex. This allows for arbitrary code execution on the user's system without prior verification of the script content. - Evidence:
curl -fsSL https://inflowcli.ai/install.sh | bashin SKILL.md - Evidence:
irm https://inflowcli.ai/install.ps1 | iexin SKILL.md - Evidence:
curl -fsSL https://inflowcli.ai/cli | bashin SKILL.md - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches the
inflowCLI and related configurations from external sources, including the domaininflowcli.aiand a Homebrew tap (inflowpayai/tap). - Evidence:
brew tap inflowpayai/tap && brew install --cask inflowin SKILL.md - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external URLs and HTTP 402 headers (MPP and x402 protocols). This data is passed to the
inflowCLI, which could be exploited if a malicious seller provides specifically crafted payloads designed to influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points:
inflow inspect <url>,inflow <mpp|x402> decode '<402 header value>'in SKILL.md - Boundary markers: None mentioned for delimiting external inputs.
- Capability inventory:
Bash(inflow:*),Bash(brew:*),Bash(curl:*)which allow file and network operations. - Sanitization: The skill relies on the CLI's internal parsing and schema validation rather than agent-side sanitization.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing a local CLI tool (
inflow) with arguments often derived from external, untrusted seller inputs, which increases the risk of command injection if the CLI does not handle inputs safely.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://inflowcli.ai/cli, https://inflowcli.ai/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata