ad-creative

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download code from an external GitHub repository (github.com/jamiepine/voicebox.git) in references/generative-tools.md for voice synthesis functionality.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In references/generative-tools.md, the skill directs the user to run npx create-video@latest. This command downloads and executes the latest version of a package from the NPM registry at runtime, which can be a vector for supply chain attacks if the package or its dependencies are compromised.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes several shell command examples for interfacing with external APIs and local scripts:
  • curl commands in references/generative-tools.md for interacting with Google Gemini and ElevenLabs APIs.
  • Node.js CLI execution in SKILL.md (e.g., node tools/clis/google-ads.js) to manage ad campaign data.
  • ffmpeg execution for media processing.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and analyze external "performance data" from CSVs, pastes, or API outputs to generate new ad variations.
  • Ingestion points: External data provided by the user (CSV, paste, API output) as described in the "Iterating from Performance Data" section of SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data are present.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to command execution (via local Node scripts) and network operations (via curl).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the input performance data before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 13, 2026, 08:44 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ad-creative