blog-flow
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
/blog flow synccommand fetches data from a third-party GitHub repository (github.com/AgriciDaniel/flow) that is not associated with the author's verified infrastructure or the trusted vendors list. These downloaded files are used as executable prompt instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes a local script
scripts/sync_flow.pyvia the shell to perform updates. This script performs network operations and writes to the local filesystem, representing a command execution surface for maintenance tasks. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of external data.
- Ingestion points: The
/blog flow optimize [url]command and templates likeconversion-audit-prompt.mdingest content from external websites and user-provided document samples (e.g., 'Page or funnel copy'). - Boundary markers: The prompt templates provided in the
references/directory do not utilize delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore malicious directives that might be embedded in the analyzed web content. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for subprocess execution (
python3) and localized filesystem writes. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization of the external URL content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata