blog-flow

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The /blog flow sync command fetches data from a third-party GitHub repository (github.com/AgriciDaniel/flow) that is not associated with the author's verified infrastructure or the trusted vendors list. These downloaded files are used as executable prompt instructions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes a local script scripts/sync_flow.py via the shell to perform updates. This script performs network operations and writes to the local filesystem, representing a command execution surface for maintenance tasks.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of external data.
  • Ingestion points: The /blog flow optimize [url] command and templates like conversion-audit-prompt.md ingest content from external websites and user-provided document samples (e.g., 'Page or funnel copy').
  • Boundary markers: The prompt templates provided in the references/ directory do not utilize delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore malicious directives that might be embedded in the analyzed web content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for subprocess execution (python3) and localized filesystem writes.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization of the external URL content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 13, 2026, 08:44 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — blog-flow