landing-page-auditor

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Step 1f of the skill instructions executes a shell command using curl and awk to measure the Time to First Byte (TTFB). The command curl ... "{URL}" directly interpolates the user-provided URL argument. If the agent does not properly escape or sanitize the input, this can lead to shell command injection if the URL contains metacharacters like semicolons or ampersands.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. It is designed to ingest and process large amounts of untrusted data from external sources including the target page text, JSON-LD schema, robots.txt, sitemap.xml, and llms.txt. These external sources could contain malicious instructions intended to manipulate the audit results or influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Steps 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e) fetches data from external URLs.
  • Boundary markers: None. The skill does not use XML tags or specific delimiters to separate untrusted web content from its internal instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (bash in Step 1f) and write files to the local disk (Step 6).
  • Sanitization: None. There are no instructions to sanitize or escape the retrieved external content before it is processed by the LLM or written to the final HTML report.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates multiple automated network requests to various external files and domains based on the user's input URL to gather data for its analysis report.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 16, 2026, 11:43 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — landing-page-auditor