agent-feedback-artifact
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/validate.shscript references and attempts to execute Python scripts located at hardcoded absolute paths (/Users/gurusharan/.codex/skills/...). This depends on an external, unverifiable environment and could lead to the execution of unauthorized code if those paths are present on the host system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts
agent-feedback-closeout.mjsandagent-feedback-preflight.mjsexecute the system commandlsofto check for active TCP listeners on the host. This is used for port availability checks during preflight and closeout operations. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection via user-provided feedback. In
scripts/agent-feedback-routing.mjs, user messages collected from the browser are interpolated directly into the prompt for sub-agents (buildWorkerPrompt) without sanitization or boundary markers. - Ingestion points: User comments are ingested via the
/api/feedbackendpoint inscripts/artifact-feedback-server.mjsand stored indata/feedback-queue.json. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the worker prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes scripts for modifying files (
test-agent-feedback-auto-runtime.mjs) and making network requests via webhooks. - Sanitization: No escaping or validation is performed on user messages before they are interpolated into the prompt.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]:
scripts/artifact-feedback-server.mjsincludes a webhook notification system that sends artifact metadata and user-provided feedback to an external URL configured via environment variables. This creates a functional channel for sending potentially sensitive data to a remote endpoint.
Audit Metadata