github-ci-fix
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes content from external sources that can be controlled by third parties.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches PR conversation comments and review threads using
scripts/fetch_comments.py, and retrieves GitHub Actions logs viascripts/inspect_pr_checks.py. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or boundary markers used in the fetching scripts to isolate untrusted data from the agent's internal instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to modify the codebase, perform
git commit,git pushto remote repositories, and create or update PRs usinggh pr create. - Sanitization: The skill does not implement sanitization or filtering of the text content retrieved from GitHub before it is presented to the agent for processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on bundled Python scripts that execute
gitandgh(GitHub CLI) commands through thesubprocessmodule. These commands are necessary for the skill's intended functionality of PR management and CI log analysis. The scripts use list-based arguments for command execution, which is a secure practice that prevents shell injection vulnerabilities.
Audit Metadata