open-knowledge
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function involves the 'ingest' procedure, where the agent fetches, processes, and preserves content from untrusted external URLs (web pages, PDFs, etc.). This ingested data is then cited and linked throughout the knowledge base. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, as malicious instructions embedded within the source content could potentially influence the agent's future reasoning or tool usage when it processes these docs.
- Ingestion points: Defined in
references/ingest-and-sources.md, where external URLs are fetched viaWebFetchorcurl. - Boundary markers: The skill uses markdown wrappers with YAML frontmatter to isolate metadata, but does not specify delimiters to neutralize instructions within the extracted text body.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
exec(shell commands like cat/ls/grep),write, andedittools to modify the project environment. - Sanitization: The skill provides significant sanitization guidelines for file paths (slug derivation) and blocks executable file extensions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides detailed instructions for downloading external resources using
curl. It implements several security 'STOP gates' to mitigate risks, including protocol restrictions (http/https only), redirect limits, and file size caps (100MB hard limit) to prevent SSRF and resource exhaustion. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes an
exectool for file system operations (ls,cat,grep,find). While the tool description specifies a restricted implementation ('not a shell'), the agent is instructed to use these commands to explore the workspace and verify ingestion results. It also involves shell-based utility calls forsha256sumandmkdir.
Audit Metadata