skills/inkeep/team-skills/code-mode/Gen Agent Trust Hub

code-mode

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 20, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local configuration files including ~/.claude.json and ~/.claude/plugins/installed_plugins.json. These files are used by the Claude Code tool to store server configurations, which often include authentication tokens, API keys, and sensitive environment variables.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to spawn local child processes for MCP servers using the 'stdio' transport. It executes commands and arguments retrieved from the local configuration files without additional validation.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill employs a dynamic execution pattern where it programmatically generates TypeScript files (e.g., _run.ts) in the /tmp/claude-code-mode/ directory and executes them using the Bun runtime.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing data from external MCP tools and using it to influence script logic or subsequent tool calls.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through client.callTool results in SKILL.md and examples.md (e.g., Figma file content).
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded instructions within tool outputs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution, network requests via HTTP/SSE transports, and file system operations.
  • Sanitization: Tool outputs are treated as trusted data and used directly in logic (e.g., finding target node IDs) or passed to other tools without sanitization.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 20, 2026, 09:07 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — code-mode